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25 June 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) [Some hard-line extremists in the rebel camp continue to oppose any concessions and are reported to be planning a campaign of terrorism against US forces in the Dominican Republic.]

[Yesterday a group of young rebel militants demonstrated before rebel headquarters demanding that there be no compromise and shouting for the departure of the US and OAS forces. They were evidently protesting the Caamano government's response of the day before to the OAS formula for a solution to the crisis. Caamano himself is reported to have seemed very disturbed as he spoke to the demonstrators and dispersed them.]

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[On Wednesday, representatives of several extremist factions [redacted] have formally approved a plan for the initiation of a terrorist campaign against US troops. The plan, [redacted] was proposed by a member of the Marxist-Leninist Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) just back from Communist China. It calls for the use of plastic explosives and time bombs against US troops. The MPD is said to be prepared to begin the terror campaign immediately.]

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[Communists, however, appear divided as to proper tactics. Some, like the leaders of the MPD, seem intent on converting the civil war into what they recognize will be a lengthy "patriotic struggle against US imperialism." Others seem prepared to go along with the Caamano government's expressed willingness to talk with the OAS on means of settling the crisis.]

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[Meanwhile, elements in the Imbert government are becoming more vocal in their criticism of the US and the OAS for standing in the way of loyalist forces anxious to move into and clean out rebel territory.]

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Algeria: The military and police forces of the Boumedienne regime are maintaining firm control, but manifestations of opposition continue to appear.

The first reliable reports from outside Algiers indicate some popular aversion to the coup. []

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[] on 22 and 23 June some 500 demonstrators there were dispersed by the army after considerable firing. A group of about 100 students, some of whom were recognized [] as Communist leaders at Oran University, stopped briefly before the US cultural center to shout, "Capitalists, assassins of President Ben Bella!"

The US Consul in Constantine reports that the situation is under control in eastern Algeria. Some scattered opposition has been shown by demonstrations of students, youths, and women in several towns there, and in one instance five persons were killed and 25 wounded. The consul notes, however, that anticoup demonstrations have taken place only in cities, and that the countryside is absolutely quiet.

Opposition printing presses are active. Mimeo-graphed tracts issued by the "Organization of the Ben Bellist Army" have been distributed in Constantine. In Algiers a tract, signed by a "Group of FLN (National Liberation Front) Militants," has appealed to all Algerians to denounce the coup and demand the liberation of Ben Bella. [A "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution," headed by extreme leftist Mohamed Boudiaf, now in Morocco, has sent a letter to Boumedienne's Council of the Revolution threatening a wave of assassinations unless the council relinquishes power.]

[The council probably is having difficulties in organizing itself. []]

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(continued)

Belkacem Krim, a foe of Ben Bella who claims to be allied with Boumedienne, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] as soon as calm is restored the "historic chiefs of the revolution" will meet in Algiers to form a new government. Presumably neither Ben Bella nor Hocine Ait Ahmed, the imprisoned Kabylie dissident leader, would participate. Krim reportedly predicted that the new government would be moderate and would slow down the application of socialist policies.]

[redacted] Mohamed Khider, another Ben Bella foe and also a "historic chief," [redacted]

[redacted]
traveled to Paris on 22 June to confer with French officials.]

The Afro-Asian foreign ministers' meeting, meanwhile, has been postponed until tomorrow.

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Greece: [Prime Minister Papandreu may be about to clash with King Constantine over control of the Greek Army.]

[Papandreu is expected to receive a parliamentary vote of confidence, possibly today, after which he reportedly plans to announce the replacement of the right-wing army chief of staff, General Gennimatas.]

[The prime minister has been severely criticized by left-liberal newspapers for his failure to remove Gennimatas and other ultraconservative senior officers. This press campaign is in turn part of a counterattack against the conservative press and politicians who have made political capital out of the discovery of a secret organization of army officers supporting the Center Union, the prime minister's own party.]

[The King, however, is determined to keep the army's loyalty focused on the throne.]

[Constantine may ask for Papandreu's resignation and force a major crisis if the prime minister moves against the chief of staff.]

[Whether Constantine would actually take such a step is problematical. Papandreu retains wide popular support and probably would threaten to take the issue "into the streets." The King, on the other hand, almost certainly would view the removal of Gennimatas without consultation and the substitution of an officer picked by a party leader as a direct threat to the royal position.]

Cyprus: [Greek and Turkish positions in negotiations for a Cyprus settlement remain far apart.]

[The principal issue is the size of territorial compensation to be given Turkey in exchange for Ankara's agreeing to union of the island with Greece. The Turks have asked for approximately 1,170 square kilometers of land along the Greek-Turkish border in northeastern Thrace. The Greek foreign minister is contemplating making a counterproposal of 450 square kilometers.]

[The Turkish claim is equivalent to 20 percent of the area of Cyprus--Turkish Cypriots make up 20 percent of the island's population. The Greek counterproposal approximates the area discussed by the two governments last summer for a Turkish military base in Cyprus.]

[Whether these are maximum or merely preliminary bargaining positions should become clear when the Greek ambassador to Ankara returns from consultations in Athens in the near future and talks are resumed.]

Cambodia - Communist China: Cambodia is accepting additional military assistance from Communist China.

On 23 June a protocol was signed in Phnom Penh under which Chinese military technicians will be sent to Cambodia. This is the first such agreement publicly concluded between the two countries, although in early 1964 a small number of Chinese military advisers were serving in Cambodia.

The technicians presumably will assist in the maintenance of weapons and equipment that Cambodia has already received from China and additional hardware Prince Sihanouk may obtain on a trip to Peiping later this year. They are also likely to supervise some training. Sihanouk probably will keep the number of Chinese to a minimum.


Sihanouk is fully aware that the protocol may cause serious reverberations in South Vietnam and Thailand. He, nevertheless, appears determined to bolster Cambodia's armed forces in the face of the increased dissident activity on the Thai frontier.

For its part, Peiping is apparently continuing its policy of cautious troublemaking by trying to heighten uneasiness among Cambodia's pro-Western neighbors. Although the Chinese have previously given Phnom Penh military assistance, they have treated the volatile Sihanouk with caution. Chinese leaders have made generalized statements of support but have carefully avoided clear-cut public commitments on Cambodia's defense.

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Common Market: [The French are apparently succeeding in undercutting German opposition to Paris' stand against the EEC Commission's financing proposals.]

[France's claim that it is willing to accept considerable delay in completion of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has had the effect of arousing strong fears that this would also delay other aspects of the Common Market as well as the Kennedy Round.]

[In response to this tactic, the Germans now are apparently willing to see essential portions of the CAP go into effect by 1967 or 1968 on the understanding that the French will agree to complete the EEC's customs union at the same time.]

[As part of the "bargain," financing arrangements similar to the present one would be continued and no commitment would be made at this time to strengthen the European Parliament. Paris reportedly may offer to "consider" the commission's plan to give customs receipts to the EEC at some future time.]

[The present German approach makes it considerably less likely that there will be a major confrontation between France and the other members when the EEC Council meets again next week. It is still uncertain, however, whether the Dutch will back down in their support of the commission's proposals.]

[The position of the commission as a whole is not clear, but President Hallstein has indicated he might settle for reaching essential economic decisions by the end of the year, in the belief that progress in "political" objectives would eventually follow.]

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Indonesia: [Both President Sukarno and Indonesian Communist Party chairman Aidit apparently are] scheduled to visit Moscow next month.

Audit is also scheduled to visit Peiping, and ^{Indonesian} ~~President~~ Sukarno may go there as well. There is no indication at this time that they will travel together, however.

[Sukarno is scheduled to leave Djakarta on 26 June for the Algiers conference. If the conference is not held, Sukarno presumably will take a trip anyway. According to his present schedule, he will go from Algiers to Rome, Paris, Vienna, Moscow, and possibly Peiping. He is to arrive in Tokyo on 16 July for a stay of undetermined length.]

According to a press report, Aidit is expected to arrive in Moscow on 4 July. His Peiping visit is said to be scheduled for sometime in late July.

It has become standard procedure for Sukarno to visit the Soviet Union and Communist China on his annual trips. Aidit last visited the bloc in 1963 and at that time also went to both Moscow and Peiping.

Although the Indonesian Communist Party has aligned itself with Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it has not rebuffed specific efforts by the Soviet party to remain friendly.

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